Blazing a Trail Out of the Voting-Rights Brawl
by Stuart Taylor, Jr.
On June 28, 1993, in Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court held that it is presumptively unconstitutional (and too much like "political apartheid") for states to manipulate voting-district lines for the purpose of moving black or Hispanic voters toward proportional representation-at least if the resulting shapes are "bizarre."
On June 30, 1994, in Johnson v. De Grandy, the Court suggested that the Voting Rights Act may often require states to manipulate voting-district lines for the purpose of moving black or Hispanic voters toward proportional representation.
What’s a state supposed to do? Comply with the Voting Rights Act by violating the Constitution? Comply with the Constitution by violating the Voting Rights Act?
Or try to thread the needle, by somehow divining what the Court will deem too "bizarre" a shape, and then designing districts to pass that test (barely), while coming as close as possible to creating majority-minority enclaves in numbers proportionate to the racial makeup of the relevant population?
As the law now stands, many states (and courts) are likely to choose the latter course. They will extract from the voting-rights jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court a peculiar touchstone: Go for proportionality, but don’t be too bizarre about it.
This sorry (not to say bizarre) state of affairs is what happens when a badly splintered Court-with warring camps that seem to talk past one another rather than to seek common ground-confronts an issue that calls for statesmanlike accommodation of two conflicting imperatives.
The first imperative is that Congress has properly decreed that in places where racial bloc voting predominates, majority-black and majority-Hispanic districts must sometimes be created to protect these traditionally underrepresented groups from having their voting power negated or diluted by submergence in a sea of whites.