At first blush, the Administration’s bid to block any testimony against Bill Clinton by his Secret Service protectors is more plausible than, say, the President’s claim of executive privilege to block other inquiries.

Protecting the President’s physical safety is clearly a paramount national interest. It often requires Secret Service members to be close by, as was the agent who took a bullet meant for President Reagan in 1981. The need for physical proximity conflicts with any President’s natural desire for personal privacy. Trust, and a degree of confidentiality, are therefore essential.

Former President Bush strongly supports Clinton’s claim that compelling agents to testify would undermine the Secret Service’s ”protective function.” As he wrote Secret Service director Lewis Merletti on April 15: ”I can assure you that had I felt (that agents) would be compelled to testify as to what they had seen or heard, no matter what the subject, I would not have felt comfortable having them close in.”

Secret Service personnel have testified before, not only in prosecutions of would-be assassins, but also in congressional hearings such as the one that revealed the existence of President Nixon’s secret taping system. But no Secret Service agent has testified against a President or his family about matters he saw or heard while guarding them. So there is no strong precedent that either supports or undercuts the privilege the Administration seeks to create.

All of this argues for some judicial protection against enlisting Secret Service members in fishing expeditions, whether conducted by congressional investigators, or by civil plaintiffs like Paula Jones, or even by prosecutors like Kenneth Starr. But it does not mean that Starr should not be able to compel Secret Service testimony that he has reason to believe may implicate the President in criminal activity.

It would be hazardous to forecast how U.S. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson will rule on the matter. But whatever she decides, the claimed Secret Service privilege–along with Clinton’s separate claim of executive privilege to block testimony by aides such as Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal– seems highly likely to be rejected (at least on these facts) when it moves on appeal to higher courts, as it inevitably will. Here’s why:

1. Courts are reluctant to create new testimonial privileges except for the most compelling of reasons. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that ”the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.” In U.S. v. Nixon in 1974, for instance, it stressed that testimonial privileges ”are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”

2. The courts are likely to be especially skeptical in the present case because the argument for a Secret Service privilege is far weaker than has generally been recognized.

It’s at best a stretch to suppose that any President would be so fearful of testimony by a Secret Service agent that he would put his life at risk by keeping his protectors at an unsafe distance. It’s an even greater stretch to suppose that any President would actually be endangered when he’s in the White House, where his security is virtually ironclad, and where sudden attacks by 22-year-old interns and other subordinates have not historically been a problem. A more rational option for a President would be to behave in an ethical and lawful manner, obviating the need for any form of Secret Service privilege.

3. In addition, the costs and risks of creating a new privilege would be high. Most immediately, Starr–and the public–would be denied what may be the most definitive evidence as to whether the President has engaged in a criminal cover-up.

Even recognition of a limited ”protective function” privilege–which Starr might well overcome, after months of litigation, by showing a compelling need for the evidence–would play into a cynical White House strategy. Stalling Starr at every possible turn, while assailing him for taking so much time, would keep the truth from coming out for as long as possible and at the same time create public relations problems for the independent counsel.

All testimonial privileges can facilitate cover-ups and delays. The attorney-client privilege is the leading example. It has routinely been used by large organizations–tobacco companies, for example–to draw a veil of secrecy over fraudulent, illegal or questionable activities.

In addition, Jonathan Turley, a professor at George Washington law school, argues (in an op-ed piece in the April 27 Wall Street Journal) that a ”protective function” privilege could end up transforming the Secret Service into ”something close to a palace guard,” or even ”a secret police.” Recalling the histories of Roman emperors’ Praetorian Guard–which used secrecy to become all-powerful–and ”the eunuchs of the Chinese emperors,” Turley raises the prospect of Secret Service agents ”assisting in a cover-up of a criminal act by a President and then insist(ing) on immunity from any testimony about their knowledge.” Far-fetched? Perhaps. But strange uses of presidential privileges are not unprecedented.

Take U.S. v. Nixon. The Court recognized a privilege for the President’s consultations with close advisers about ”the process of shaping policies and making decisions,” while holding, 8-0, that Nixon’s executive privilege must give way to a special prosecutor’s ”demonstrated, specific need for evidence.” Who in 1974 would have imagined that this would be cited by another President as a basis for denying another special counsel evidence of another alleged obstruction-of-justice conspiracy–this time, to cover up a relationship with a White House intern?

4. The fact that no President before Clinton has needed to block prosecutors from seeking Secret Service testimony casts doubt on whether any President after Clinton is likely to need such a privilege.

Most Presidents have not had to worry about being implicated in crimes by their protectors. Indeed, Secret Service agents–unlike CIA agents–have never even been required to sign confidentiality agreements. And (like other government employees) they are required by statute to report to the Justice Department any evidence implicating any government officer or employee in a federal crime.

In this regard, while Clinton has suggested that it is not he but the Secret Service that is seeking a privilege, it’s curious how neatly the privilege crafted for Clinton’s Secret Service by Clinton’s Justice Department fits the personal needs of Bill Clinton.

Justice has reportedly conceded that the proposed privilege would not bar testimony by an agent who was the only witness to a completed crime–such as the acceptance of a cash bribe–by the President. No problem for Bill Clinton there. But Justice says that it would bar a Secret Service witness from giving corroborating evidence that the President had committed a crime. The distinction proposed by the Justice Department seems made to order for Bill Clinton.

Would Justice’s logic bar an agent from exposing a President’s confession of a bribe or a rape or a murder? We don’t know: The privilege claims are being made and heard in secret.

5. Creation of a grandiose new testimonial privilege is not the only way for the courts to block unwarranted subpoenas to Secret Service members by prosecutors or others engaged in fishing expeditions. The rules of procedure provide alternatives.

Consider the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes. The Justices rejected the notion of a special 1st Amendment privilege for news reporters to refuse to testify before grand juries. But Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. stressed, in a pivotal concurrence, that this left room for reporters to move to quash any questions that are posed for reasons of harassment, that serve no ”legitimate need of law enforcement,” or that have ”only a remote and tenuous relationship” to any alleged crime. Over the years, Branzburg has proved to be a powerful antidote to unwarranted subpoenas of reporters.

Finally, even if you believe there should be a broad privilege for Secret Service members, that doesn’t mean the President should hide behind it.

The Secret Service works for President Clinton. If he told it and its members to waive any claim of privilege and tell the truth, they would. Does anyone doubt that that’s exactly what Clinton would do if the truth would exonerate him?

It is extremely telling that this President prefers silence to full disclosure, from the Secret Service, and from the aides whom he has wrapped in claims of executive privilege, and from Monica Lewinsky, and from Susan McDougal, and from others. Not to mention the long silence of Bill Clinton himself.

The question won’t go away: Is this the behavior of a man who thinks the truth is on his side?